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How Should We Study District Judge  
Decision-Making?  
Pauline T. Kim 
Margo Schlanger 
Christina L. Boyd 
Andrew D. Martin∗ 
INTRODUCTION 
Understanding judicial decision-making requires attention to the 
specific institutional settings in which judges operate. The choices 
available to judges are determined not only by the law and facts of 
the case but also by procedural context. The incentives and 
constraints shaping judges’ decision-making will vary depending on, 
for example, whether they have a life-appointment or are elected; 
whether they hear cases alone or with colleagues; and whether and 
under what circumstances their decisions might be altered, 
overturned, or undone by the actions of others. The basic insight that 
the institutional context matters has led to increasingly sophisticated 
studies of how strategic interactions among Supreme Court justices,1 
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Law and Visiting Professor of Law at UCLA; Boyd is a Ph.D. candidate in Political Science 
and a Graduate Student Associate of the Center for Empirical Research in the Law (“CERL”); 
Martin is Professor and CERL Director, School of Law, and Professor and Chair, Department 
of Political Science, Arts & Sciences. We thank Washington University School of Law for 
summer research support, Jessica Smith for assisting with the background research, and the 
staff of the Journal of Law & Policy for organizing this symposium. The research described in 
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 1. See, e.g., TIMOTHY R. JOHNSON, ORAL ARGUMENTS AND DECISION MAKING ON THE 
UNITED STATES SUPREME COURT (2004); FORREST MALTZMAN, JAMES F. SPRIGGS II & PAUL 
J. WAHLBECK, CRAFTING LAW ON THE SUPREME COURT: THE COLLEGIAL GAME (2000); 
Gregory A. Caldeira, John R. Wright & Christopher J. W. Zorn, Sophisticated Voting and Gate-
Keeping in the Supreme Court, 15 J.L. ECON. & ORG. 549 (1999) (empirically testing whether 
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among branches of government,2 and within a judicial hierarchy3 
shape judicial decision-making. But studies of federal district 
judges—the nearly one thousand judges who compose 78% of the 
federal judiciary4 and superintend 79% of its cases5—have not 
matched this sophistication. Instead, much of the existing empirical 
work on federal district courts has failed to take account of the 
institutional setting in which those judges operate.  
Too often, studies of the district courts rely on an implicit 
assumption that judging at the trial court level is fundamentally the 
 
Supreme Court Justices engage in strategic voting in certiorari decisions); Forrest Maltzman & 
Paul J. Wahlbeck, Strategic Policy Considerations and Voting Fluidity on the Burger Court, 90 
AM. POL. SCI. REV. 581 (1996) (empirically testing whether Supreme Court Justices act 
strategically in changing their votes between initial conference and final vote); Paul J. 
Wahlbeck, James F. Spriggs II & Forrest Maltzman, Marshalling the Court: Bargaining and 
Accommodation on the United States Supreme Court, 42 AM. J. POL. SCI. 294 (1998) 
(examining Supreme Court draft opinions to test empirically whether they are written 
strategically). 
 2. See, e.g., LEE EPSTEIN & JACK KNIGHT, THE CHOICES JUSTICES MAKE (1998) 
(arguing that justices make decisions based not only on their political preferences but also 
institutional constraints); William N. Eskridge, Jr., Overriding Supreme Court Statutory 
Interpretation Decisions, 101 YALE L. J. 331 (1991) (theorizing that decision-making among 
the three branches is a product of the dynamic interactions of the three branches). But see 
Jeffrey A. Segal, Separation-of-Powers Games in the Positive Theory of Congress and Courts, 
91 AM. POL. SCI. REV. 28 (1997) (finding that justices deciding statutory cases largely vote 
sincerely).  
 3. See, e.g., VIRGINIA A. HETTINGER, STEPHANIE LINQUIST & WENDY L. MARTINEK, 
JUDGING ON A COLLEGIAL COURT: INFLUENCES ON FEDERAL APPELLATE DECISION MAKING 
(2006); Sara C. Benesh & Malia Reddick, Overruled: An Event History Analysis of Lower 
Court Reaction to Supreme Court Alteration of Precedent, 64 J. POL. 534 (2002); Charles M. 
Cameron, Jeffrey A. Segal & Donald Songer, Strategic Auditing in a Political Hierarchy: An 
Informational Model of the Supreme Court’s Certiorari Decisions, 94 AM. POL. SCI. REV. 101 
(2000) (using principal-agent model of upper and lower courts to explore conflicts over policy); 
Susan B. Haire, Stephanie A. Linquist & Donald R. Songer, Appellate Court Supervision in the 
Federal Judiciary: A Hierarchical Perspective, 37 LAW & SOC’Y REV. 143 (2003); 
McNollgast, Politics and the Courts: A Positive Theory of Judicial Doctrine and the Rule of 
Law, 68 S. CAL. L. REV. 1631 (1995) (modeling judicial decision-making as product of 
strategic interactions between upper and lower courts); Donald R. Songer, Jeffrey A. Segal & 
Charles M. Cameron, The Hierarchy of Justice: Testing a Principal-Agent Model of Supreme 
Court-Circuit Court Interactions, 38 AM. J. POL. SCI. 673 (1994) (examining the interactions 
between courts of appeals and the Supreme Court and finding that the circuit courts are largely 
responsive to the Supreme Court’s preferences). 
 4. These figures include both active and senior judges, on the district courts and the 
courts of appeals. ADMINISTRATIVE OFFICE OF THE UNITED STATES COURTS, JUDICIAL 
BUSINESS OF THE UNITED STATES COURTS: 2007 ANNUAL REPORT OF THE DIRECTOR 42, tbl. 
11.  
 5. Id. at 19, tbl. 1; id. at 22, tbl. 3. 
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same as judging at the appellate level. These studies therefore employ 
models and methods developed to study the Supreme Court or the 
federal courts of appeals. We argue below that this approach is 
misguided, because the nature of district judges’ work is substantially 
different from that of appellate judges. For example, unlike in the 
typical appellate case, a district judge may rule in a single case on 
multiple occasions and on different types of questions, only a few of 
which could be dispositive but all of which affect the case’s progress 
and ultimate outcome. Moreover, because many of the judge’s 
actions are taken in response to motions by the parties, there is no 
determinate sequence in which pretrial litigation events occur. 
Rather, how a case proceeds depends on the choices made by the 
parties—what motions are filed by whom and how discovery unfolds.  
The work of the district judge is also more varied than that of an 
appeals judge. In addition to the law-applying and law-interpreting 
functions familiar to observers of the appellate courts, the district 
judge undertakes other tasks such as finding facts, resolving disputes 
about the scope of litigation, setting deadlines, facilitating settlement, 
and supervising trial before a jury.6 Of course, as in the courts of 
appeals, many cases in the district courts are resolved by agreement 
or abandonment rather than adjudication.7 But in the district courts 
far more than in the courts of appeals, even in these settled or 
withdrawn cases, a judge has often made some or even many 
decisions that may well have influenced the likelihood and the terms 
of the non-adjudicated outcome.  
In this Essay, we argue for a new and more suitable approach to 
studying decision-making in the federal district courts—one that 
takes into account the trial level litigation process and the varied 
nature of the tasks judging in a trial court entails. We begin in Part I 
by describing in detail the institutional setting in which district judges 
function and how their role differs substantially from that of appellate 
judges. In Part II we critique the existing empirical literature’s 
predominant method for studying district courts—analysis of district 
court opinions, usually published opinions—and discuss the 
 
 6. See Judith Resnik, Managerial Judges, 96 HARV. L. REV. 374 (1982). 
 7. See, e.g., Mori Irvine, Better Late than Never: Settlement at the Federal Court of 
Appeals, 1 J. APP. PRAC. & PROCESS 341 (1999); see also infra notes 50–51. 
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limitations and biases inherent in this approach. Part III then proposes 
our new approach to studying decision-making by district judges.  
By taking advantage of the electronic docketing system now 
operating in all federal district courts, researchers can use dockets, 
orders, and other case documents, as well as opinions, as data 
sources, thereby incorporating into their analysis the relevant 
institutional features of district courts. In particular, expanding the 
focus beyond opinions allows researchers to capture both the 
procedural context and the iterative nature of district judge decision-
making. In addition, examining dockets permits direct study of the 
incidence and timing of party settlements and their resulting effects 
on case selection. Conversely, docket information can be used to test 
whether judicial decisions in turn influence litigants’ settlement 
behavior. Finally, in Part IV, we describe an ongoing project focused 
on the litigation activities of the Equal Employment Opportunity 
Commission, in which we implement this new approach to studying 
the work of the district courts. 
I. THE INSTITUTIONAL CONTEXT 
Much of the quantitative work on judicial decision-making 
focuses on appellate judging and therefore relies on models that 
assume features typical of appellate courts. For example, the 
considerable literature on the United States Supreme Court builds on 
observations about that Court’s unique position as a collegial court 
situated at the top of the judicial hierarchy, with a discretionary 
docket.8 Similarly, scholars who study the federal courts of appeals 
take into account their location in the judicial hierarchy, modeling 
their compliance with Supreme Court precedent,9 the interaction 
among judges on appellate panels,10 and the determinants of en banc 
 
 8. See, e.g., H. W. PERRY, JR., DECIDING TO DECIDE: AGENDA SETTING IN THE UNITED 
STATES SUPREME COURT (1991); Jeffrey R. Lax, Certiorari and Compliance in the Judicial 
Hierarchy, 15 J. THEORETICAL POL. 61 (2003); Cameron et al., supra note 3. 
 9. See, e.g., Benesh & Reddick, supra note 3; McNollgast, supra note 3; Songer et al., 
supra note 3. 
 10. Frank B. Cross & Emerson H. Tiller, Judicial Partisanship and Obedience to Legal 
Doctrine: Whistleblowing on the Federal Courts of Appeals, 107 YALE L.J. 2155 (1998); Sean 
Farhang & Gregory Wawro, Institutional Dynamics on the U.S. Court of Appeals: Minority 
Representation Under Panel Decision Making, 20 J.L. ECON. & ORG. 299 (2004); Cass R. 
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review and en banc decisions.11 But in the relatively scant empirical 
literature on district courts, little attention has been paid to how their 
institutional features shape judges’ decision-making. Empirical 
studies of district courts have tended unreflectively to borrow models 
developed to study the appellate courts, without considering the 
systematic ways in which trial and appellate courts differ. As we 
argue below, the work of district judges differs in significant ways 
from that of appellate judges, and these differences must be taken 
into account in order to build appropriate models for studying district 
judge decision-making. 
A. Federal Courts of Appeals 
Empirical scholars often begin with the assumption that federal 
court of appeals judges have policy preferences that they seek to 
advance through their decisions.12 Although federal judges are 
technically non-partisan, they are appointed through a political 
process involving presidential nomination and Senate confirmation—
a process during which ideological concerns are often raised. On the 
other hand, as Article III judges, they have life tenure and their salary 
cannot be diminished, affording them a degree of insulation from 
direct political pressure once appointed. Given this institutional 
structure, a number of studies have sought to determine whether and 
to what extent court of appeals decisions are influenced by judges’ 
policy goals or constrained by legal precedent.13  
 
Sunstein, David Schkade & Lisa M. Ellman, Ideological Voting on Federal Courts of Appeals: 
A Preliminary Investigation, 90 VA. L. REV. 301 (2004); Pauline T. Kim, Deliberation and 
Strategy on the United States Courts of Appeals: An Empirical Exploration of Panel Effects, U. 
PA. L. REV. 1319 (2009).  
 11. See, e.g., Tracey George, The Dynamics and Determinants of the Decision to Grant 
En Banc Review, 74 WASH. L. REV. 213 (1999); Tracey George & Michael E. Solimine, 
Supreme Court Monitoring of Courts of Appeals En Banc, 9 SUP. CT. ECON. REV. 171 (2001). 
 12. See, e.g., HETTINGER ET AL., supra note 3; Benesh & Reddick, supra note 3; Cameron 
et al., supra note 3; Cross & Tiller, supra note 10; Farhang & Wawro, supra note 3; Songer et 
al., supra note 3. 
 13. See, e.g., THOMAS G. HANSFORD & JAMES F. SPRIGGS II, THE POLITICS OF 
PRECEDENT ON THE U.S. SUPREME COURT (2006); Benesh & Reddick, supra note 3; Cross & 
Tiller, supra note 10; Joseph L. Smith & Emerson H. Tiller, The Strategy of Judging: Evidence 
from Administrative Law, 31 J. LEGAL STUD. 61 (2002); Songer et al., supra note 3; Paul J. 
Wahlbeck, The Life of the Law: Judicial Politics and Legal Change, 59 J. POL. 778 (1997). 
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As intermediate level courts, the courts of appeals review 
decisions of the federal trial courts. Their cases follow a well-defined 
trajectory through the appellate process to resolution. The process is 
initiated when a litigant, unhappy with a decision below, files a 
timely notice of appeal.14 That notice triggers a fairly predictable set 
of events: the record is prepared and transmitted to the appellate 
court;15 briefs are filed in turn by the parties (appellant’s opening 
brief, appellee’s brief, appellant’s reply brief);16 the case is 
calendared for oral argument unless the court decides argument is 
unnecessary;17 a three-judge panel convenes to decide the case;18 and, 
ultimately, those judges issue some kind of written decision, which 
may or may not be designated for publication. 
Settlement,19 abandonment, or a procedural defect in the appeal 
may halt the process in its tracks,20 but otherwise cases proceed in a 
fairly predictable way. Minor variations in this procedural account 
may occur—for example, there may be motions to extend time 
deadlines, permit the participation of amici, or stay a case pending 
some other event. However, in the vast majority of federal appellate 
cases that are adjudicated, the basic process leading to final 
resolution does not deviate significantly from the one just described. 
Not only is the appellate process largely standardized, but the nature 
of the appellate judge’s role is similarly well defined. The basic task 
facing the appellate judge is quite straightforward, if not always 
simple to carry out. She must consider the record from the court 
 
 14. FED. R. APP. P. 3(a).  
 15. E.g., ROBERT L. STERN, APPELLATE PRACTICE IN THE UNITED STATES 133–34 (2d ed. 
1989). 
 16. STEVEN WISOTSKY, PROFESSIONAL JUDGMENT ON APPEAL: BRINGING AND OPPOSING 
APPEALS 130–31 (2002). 
 17. Id. 
 18. Id. 
 19. Appellate court mediation programs have become increasingly popular in recent years. 
In the Eleventh Circuit, for example, cases can be directed to formal mediation by “[a]n active 
or senior judge of the court of appeals, a panel of judges (either before or after oral argument), 
or the Kinnard Mediation Center, by appointment of the court.” 11TH CIR. R. 33(c). According 
to the Eleventh Circuit, “[t]he purposes of the mediation are to explore the possibility of 
settlement of the dispute, to prevent unnecessary motions or delay by attempting to resolve any 
procedural problems in the appeal, and to identify and clarify issues presented in the appeal.” 
Id.; see also Irvine, supra note 7.  
 20. WISOTSKY, supra note 16, at 241–60. 
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below, the relevant legal authorities and the arguments of the parties 
and, together with her panel colleagues, pass judgment on the 
decision of the district court that is being appealed—either affirming 
it, reversing it, or remanding the case to the district court for further 
consideration. Thus, her primary role is one of law application and 
law interpretation. 
B. Federal District Courts 
Federal district judges, like federal court of appeals judges, are 
appointed through a process of presidential nomination and Senate 
confirmation to positions of life tenure. And, as in the case of 
appellate judges, scholars have posited that district judges are 
political actors—that is, that they have policy goals and preferences 
that influence how they decide cases.21 District judges, however, 
work in a very different environment than court of appeals judges do. 
Even assuming that they have policy goals, their position as trial 
judges—the first responders in a judicial system open to a growing 
number of claimants—suggests that concerns about case management 
and docket control are also significant, if not dominant, motivations. 
Moreover, district judges interact with their colleagues in quite 
different ways. While the court of appeals judge hears cases as a 
member of a three-judge panel that is usually composed of her circuit 
colleagues, a single district judge is usually assigned to a case at any 
given time. However, the district judge does not necessarily 
determine the outcomes of cases alone. Magistrate judges, appointed 
by the judges in a district for eight-year terms, play an increasingly 
important role in managing federal litigation. Both a magistrate and a 
district court judge may make decisions on different issues in the 
same case. And because district court litigation can stretch over long 
periods of time, recusals, retirements, and the like may mean that 
more than one district judge or more than one magistrate judge will 
make decisions in a given case over its lifetime. Unlike in the courts 
of appeals, it is nearly impossible to identify a standard way in which 
cases proceed through the district courts. Although district court 
 
 21. See, e.g., C.K. ROWLAND & ROBERT A. CARP, POLITICS AND JUDGMENT IN FEDERAL 
DISTRICT COURTS (1996). 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
90 Journal of Law & Policy [Vol. 29:83 
 
 
cases, like appellate cases, are frequently settled or abandoned before 
judgment,22 far more variation exists than at the appellate level in the 
procedure followed and in the role of the judge prior to the non-
adjudicated resolution. At one extreme, the parties to a dispute may 
invoke the power of the court only to facilitate judicial enforcement 
of an agreement they have reached out of court. In such a case, the 
judge may do nothing to resolve the dispute other than entering a 
jointly proposed consent decree, the terms of which are determined—
possibly even prior to filing—by the parties. At the other extreme, a 
case may remain active in the district court for years, even decades, 
involving multiple parties, multiple judges, teams of lawyers, 
complex procedural maneuvering and extensive discovery, a trial 
before a jury, and post-trial skirmishing before a final judgment is 
entered. In such a case, the district judge will be required to make 
case-specific decisions at multiple points throughout the litigation, 
deciding numerous pre-trial motions, resolving discovery disputes, 
setting schedules and discovery limits, presiding over the trial 
proceedings, and ruling on post-trial motions.23 Between these two 
extremes, in the more typical case, a district judge, perhaps assisted 
by a magistrate judge, will preside over a status and/or settlement 
conference or two, issue a handful of orders regarding scheduling and 
other administrative matters, and perhaps decide a few pre-trial 
motions before the case is resolved by a settlement between the 
parties.  
This description of the work of the district courts highlights a 
number of important differences from the appellate courts. First, 
district judges often make multiple decisions at different times before 
a case is finally resolved, while appellate court judges typically act in 
a case at a single point in time—when rendering a decision on the 
appeal. Thus, when making a decision, the district judge is aware that 
she may have other opportunities to shape the outcome of the case. 
For example, the district judge knows that if she grants a motion to 
dismiss with prejudice, the case will be removed from her docket; 
 
 22. See infra notes 52–53. 
 23. See David A. Hoffman, Alan J. Izenman & Jeffrey R. Lidicker, Docketology, District 
Courts, and Doctrine, 85 WASH. U. L. REV. 681 (2007) (reporting considerable variance in 
number of docket entries in district court cases studied). 
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however, if she denies the motion, she will make other decisions later 
in the case, unless it is settled or abandoned first. Another difference 
from appellate cases is that litigation events in district courts do not 
inevitably occur in a fixed sequence. It is true that certain events 
typically precede other events; however, all possible events do not 
inevitably occur, and if they occur, they will not necessarily happen 
in any particular order. For example, a defendant may bring a motion 
to dismiss before answering the complaint; choose to answer without 
bringing such a motion at all; or move to dismiss the case for failure 
to state a claim at a much later time, even at trial. As a result of these 
litigant choices, district court cases, in contrast to appellate cases, 
may involve any of a nearly infinite number of combinations of pre-
trial, trial, and post-trial decisions by the judge.  
In addition to differences in the number and timing of judicial 
decisions, the types of decisions judges make are quite different in 
district courts and courts of appeals. Some of the district judge’s 
decisions—for example, whether or not to dismiss a case for failure 
to state a claim, whether or not to grant summary judgment, or 
whether a plaintiff has proven liability at trial—look a great deal like 
prototypical appellate decisions. They are clearly “on the merits” in 
the sense that the judge is adjudicating the relative strengths of the 
legal or factual claims made by the parties. They involve assessing 
the evidence offered by the parties and/or applying the law to the 
facts presented by the case. In some instances, where a case raises a 
novel issue, a judge may interpret ambiguous legal authority. 
Depending on who wins, many of these “on the merits” decisions are 
final judgments and therefore directly appealable.24  
However, unique to the work of district judges is their role in 
establishing a factual record. The district judge must decide what 
evidence is relevant and admissible for what purposes, and how 
certain facts will be entered in the record. If a jury sits as the ultimate 
fact-finder, the judge must instruct them about the evidence and 
frame the factual issues for them to decide. In the case of a bench 
 
 24. “The courts of appeals . . . shall have jurisdiction of appeals from all final decisions of 
the district courts of the United States . . . .” 28 U.S.C. § 1291 (2006). A final decision is “one 
which ends the litigation on the merits and leaves nothing for the court to do but execute the 
judgment.” Catlin v. United States, 324 U.S. 229, 233 (1945). 
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trial, the district judge must sift through the evidence herself, 
weighing its probativeness, drawing inferences, and ultimately 
determining matters of historical fact. While subject to appeal, these 
factual determinations by a district court are reviewed under an 
extremely deferential standard of review.25 
Unlike appellate judges, moreover, district judges make many 
other types of decisions that neither resolve the parties’ dispute nor 
directly address the merits of the parties’ existing claims. Although 
characterized as “procedural,” these decisions can have an enormous 
impact on the scope of the subsequent litigation and thus the 
likelihood that a given litigant will ultimately prevail. For example, a 
district judge may decide whether to grant a motion to allow the 
plaintiff to amend her complaint to add new theories of liability, 
whether to permit the defendant to bring counterclaims against the 
plaintiff, whether to compel a party to produce certain materials in 
discovery, or whether to bifurcate the liability and damages phases of 
a trial. In each of these situations, the decision of the district judge 
does not resolve or even directly address the merits of the claims or 
defenses. Nevertheless, the influence on the subsequent course and 
outcome of the litigation can be profound. The plaintiff unable to add 
a new theory of liability or discover information critical to her case 
will face lower odds of ultimately prevailing in the case. Similarly, 
the defendant’s prospects diminish if it cannot pursue a counterclaim 
or if it must respond to evidence of catastrophic harm suffered by a 
plaintiff at the same time that it tries to deny liability. By changing 
the odds facing each party, these “procedural” decisions also affect 
the relative strengths of the parties’ negotiating positions and 
therefore the terms on which they will be willing to settle. Although 
these types of decisions constitute a substantial proportion of the 
district judge’s work, they are usually not final decisions and 
therefore are only rarely reviewed by courts of appeals.26 
 
 25. See Anderson v. City of Bessemer City, 470 U.S. 564, 573–74 (1985). 
 26. Although in theory interlocutory appeal is possible pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1292(b) 
(2006), a district court must first state in writing that an otherwise unappealable order “involves 
a controlling question of law as to which there is substantial ground for difference of opinion 
and that an immediate appeal from the order may materially advance the ultimate termination of 
the litigation,” and the court of appeals must agree to hear the appeal. 28 U.S.C. § 1292(b) 
(2006). In fact, few interlocutory orders are ever reviewed pursuant to § 1292(b). See Michael 
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Finally, in addition to making decisions “on the merits” and on 
procedural matters affecting the scope of litigation, district judges 
increasingly act in a “managerial” role, diverging even further from 
court of appeals judges. A quarter century ago, Judith Resnick 
described the emergence of “managerial judging,” in which district 
judges do not simply adjudicate disputes brought to them by the 
parties, but instead assume an active role in supervising cases and 
take on the responsibility of shepherding them to a final resolution.27 
This shift in the nature of the district judge’s role has only become 
more pronounced in the time since Resnick wrote. Today, district 
judges are required under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 16 to enter 
a scheduling order in every case soon after its initiation.28 The 
scheduling order must set time limits for joining parties, amending 
the pleadings, filing motions, and completing discovery, and may 
also include directions regarding required disclosures and electronic 
discovery, address issues of privilege or work product protection, and 
set dates for conferences and trial. In addition, the district judge is 
empowered under Rule 16 to address such matters as “formulating 
and simplifying the issues,” the possibility of settlement, the use of 
procedural devices for promoting dispute resolution, and “adopting 
special procedures for managing potentially difficult or protracted 
actions.”29 
The shift to managerial judging substantially affects the nature of 
the district judge’s role. Under the traditional model of 
adjudication—largely still applicable in the appellate courts—judges 
are detached from the process by which evidence and arguments are 
brought before the court.30 The litigants, outside the view of the 
court, develop their strategies and theories and then present the 
factual record, relevant authorities, and legal arguments through 
 
E. Solimine, Revitalizing Interlocutory Appeals in the Federal Courts, 58 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 
1165, 1174 (1990) (reporting that in the 1980s about 35% of § 1292(b) appeals were accepted, 
representing only about 0.3% of appeals). 
 27. Resnick, supra note 6.  
 28. FED. R. CIV. P. 16(b)(2) says that “[t]he judge must issue the scheduling order as soon 
as practicable, but in any event within the earlier of 120 days after any defendant has been 
served with the complaint of 90 days after any defendant has appeared.”  
 29. FED. R. CIV. P. 16(c). 
 30. Resnick, supra note 6. 
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written submissions or highly structured public testimony by 
witnesses or legal argument by lawyers. Communications between 
the attorneys and the court are formal, public, and limited in scope. In 
contrast, federal district judges today interact with the parties—or at 
least their attorneys—in a variety of ways both formal and informal 
and on a broad scope of issues. In order to create a scheduling order, 
judges must discuss with the attorneys their views about the 
complexity of a case, the central issues it raises and the evidentiary or 
management challenges it presents. Resolving discovery disputes 
requires judges to “immerse themselves in the factual details of the 
case” at an early stage of the litigation and to “consider the parties’ 
litigation strategies.”31 Moreover, heavy caseloads incentivize judges 
to actively encourage settlement by discussing likely trial outcomes 
with the litigants or referring cases for alternative dispute resolution 
procedures.  
In short, judging on the federal district courts is fundamentally 
different from appellate judging.  
II. EXISTING STUDIES OF DISTRICT JUDGE DECISION-MAKING  
Despite the significant differences between judging on the district 
and appellate courts, most quantitative studies of judicial decision-
making have treated them largely the same. (There are, however, a 
few notable exceptions,32 along with qualitative studies that have 
more frequently taken full account of trial court contexts.)33 
Following methods developed to study Supreme Court and court of 
appeals decision-making, a number of scholars have collected data on 
the outcomes of district court cases using officially published reports 
or, more recently, electronically available opinions as the source of 
data. Coding these outcomes as liberal or conservative, or according 
 
 31. Id. at 393. 
 32. Malcolm Feeley’s classic exploration of trial-level criminal court proceedings is a 
source of insight here, though he finds quantitative analysis fairly unhelpful, and moves quickly 
on to the qualitative analysis that is the core of his book. MALCOLM M. FEELEY, THE PROCESS 
IS THE PUNISHMENT: HANDLING CASES IN A LOWER CRIMINAL COURT 123–53 (1979).  
 33. See id. at 154–297; KENNETH M. DOLBEARE, TRIAL COURTS IN URBAN POLITICS: 
STATE COURT POLICY IMPACT AND FUNCTIONS IN A LOCAL POLITICAL SYSTEM (1967); 
BARBARA YNGVESSON, VIRTUOUS CITIZENS DISRUPTIVE SUBJECTS: ORDER AND COMPLAINT 
IN A NEW ENGLAND COURT (1993). 
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to the success or failure of certain arguments or parties, scholars have 
sought to answer such questions as whether judges are political 
policy-makers, whether their decisions are influenced by social 
background characteristics or prior experiences, or whether they tend 
to favor certain types of litigants or legal theories.34 
Work by C. K. Rowland and Robert A. Carp is typical of the 
approach taken by many political scientists studying the federal 
district courts. In perhaps the most comprehensive study of district 
court decision-making, Rowland and Carp analyzed nearly 46,000 
opinions published in the Federal Supplement over a 44-year 
period.35 They divided the cases according to issue area and coded 
the outcome of each as “liberal” or “conservative.”36 Analyzing this 
 
 34. See, e.g., John R. Allison & Mark A. Lemley, The (Unnoticed) Demise of the Doctrine 
of Equivalents, 59 STAN. L. REV. 955 (2007); Barton Beebe, An Empirical Study of U.S. 
Copyright Fair Use Opinions, 1978–2005, 156 U. PA. L. REV. 549 (2008); Robert A. Carp et 
al., The Voting Behavior of Judges Appointed by President Bush, 76 JUDICATURE 298 (1993); 
Theodore Eisenberg & Sheri Lynn Johnson, The Effects of Intent: Do We Know How Legal 
Standards Work?, 76 CORNELL L. REV. 1151 (1991); Mitu Gulati, Jeffrey J. Rachlinski & 
Donald C. Langevoort, Fraud by Hindsight, 98 NW. U. L. REV. 773 (2004); Robert A. Hillman, 
Questioning the “New Consensus” on Promissory Estoppel: An Empirical and Theoretical 
Study, 98 COLUM. L. REV. 580 (1998); Sean M. McEldowney, New Insights on the “Death” of 
Obviousness: An Empirical Study of District Court Obviousness Opinions, 2006 STAN. TECH. 
L. REV. 4; Wendy Parker, The Decline of Judicial Decisionmaking: School Desegregation and 
District Court Judges, 81 N.C. L. REV. 1623 (2003); C. K. Rowland, Robert A. Carp & Ronald 
A. Stidham, Judges’ Policy Choices and the Value Basis of Judicial Appointments: A 
Comparison of Support for Criminal Defendants Among Nixon, Johnson, and Kennedy 
Appointees to the Federal District Courts, 46 J. POL. 886 (1984); C. K. Rowland, Donald 
Songer & Robert A. Carp, Presidential Effects on Criminal Justice Policy in the Lower Federal 
Courts: The Reagan Judges, 22 LAW & SOC’Y REV. 191 (1988); Vicki Schultz & Stephen 
Petterson, Race, Gender, Work, and Choice: An Empirical Study of the Lack of Interest Defense 
in Title VII Cases Challenging Job Segregation, 59 U. CHI. L. REV. 1073 (1992); Jennifer A. 
Segal, Representative Decision Making on the Federal Bench: Clinton’s District Court 
Appointees, 53 POL. RES. Q. 137 (2000); Gregory C. Sisk, Michael Heise & Andrew P. Morriss, 
Charting the Influences on the Judicial Mind: An Empirical Study of Judicial Reasoning, 73 
N.Y.U. L. REV. 1377 (1998); Gregory C. Sisk, Michael Heise & Andrew P. Morriss, Searching 
for the Soul of Judicial Decisionmaking: An Empirical Study of Religious Freedom Decisions, 
65 OHIO ST. L.J. 491 (2004); Ronald Stidham, Robert A. Carp & Donald R. Songer, The Voting 
Behavior of President Clinton’s Judicial Appointees, 80 JUDICATURE 16 (1996); Thomas G. 
Walker & Deborah J. Barrow, The Diversification of the Federal Bench: Policy and Process 
Ramifications, 47 J. POL. 596 (1985); Thomas G. Walker, A Note Concerning Partisan 
Influences on Trial-Judge Decision Making, 6 LAW & SOC’Y REV. 645 (1972); Adam Winkler, 
Fatal in Theory and Strict in Fact: An Empirical Analysis of Strict Scrutiny in the Federal 
Courts, 59 VAND. L. REV. 793 (2006). 
 35. ROWLAND & CARP, supra note 21, at 18. 
 36. Id. at 22–23. 
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outcome data, they concluded that Democratic judges are more likely 
to vote liberally than Republican judges, although the degree of 
partisan difference varies depending upon the issue.37 They further 
examined this outcome data for correlations with the composition of 
the Supreme Court, time trends, the party of the appointing President, 
and geographic influences.38 Other studies by judicial politics 
scholars have followed a similar strategy of coding the outcomes of 
district court opinions as liberal or conservative in order to test 
theories about judicial decision-making.39 
Empirically minded legal scholars have asked different questions, 
but have also largely relied on opinions—usually published ones—
for analysis. Some have examined federal district court opinions in 
order to determine whether social background or prior professional 
experience influences judicial decision-making. For example, 
Gregory C. Sisk, Michael Heise, and Andrew P. Morriss studied 
published federal district court and appellate opinions in religious 
freedom cases and concluded that the religious background of judges, 
as well as the religious affiliation of claimants, significantly 
influenced judicial votes in these cases.40 Other scholars have 
explored how various legal doctrines affect who wins certain types of 
cases, again relying on published district court opinions for their 
data.41 For example, Vicki Schultz and Stephen Petterson examined 
published Title VII opinions to determine how plaintiffs fared when 
resisting a “lack of interest” defense in races and sex discrimination 
cases.42 
Focusing only on published opinions may make sense when 
asking, for example, how formal legal doctrine has evolved. 
However, when research aims to understand what factors influence 
case outcomes or how judges make decisions, an analysis based 
 
 37. Id. at 24. 
 38. Id. at 25–38, 39–44, 45–57, 58–86. 
 39. See, e.g., Carp et al., supra note 34; Rowland, Carp & Stidham, supra note 34; 
Rowland, Songer & Carp, supra note 34; Stidham et al., supra note 34; Walker & Barrow, 
supra note 34; Walker, supra note 34. 
 40. Sisk, Heise & Morriss, supra note 34, at 613–14.  
 41. E.g., Eisenberg & Johnson, supra note 34; Schultz & Petterson, supra note 34; 
Winkler, supra note 34.  
 42. Schultz & Petterson, supra note 34, at 1089. 
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solely on published opinions is problematic. In particular, such an 
approach risks producing biased or misleading results because 
published opinions are not representative of all opinions; opinions are 
not representative of all district court decisions; and adjudicated cases 
are not representative of all filed cases. To begin, published 
opinions—at both the district court and appellate levels—constitute 
only a small portion of opinions,43 and that portion is decidedly 
unrepresentative. Opinions are not randomly selected for publication; 
rather, authoring judges decide whether to designate a particular 
opinion for publication, and their decision to do so may depend upon 
formal rules, court culture, personal predilections, or strategic 
considerations. Numerous studies have found that published and 
unpublished opinions differ in systematic ways.44 For example, 
Rowland and Carp found that published district court opinions are 
generally more “liberal” than unpublished ones, and that ideological 
influences appear to be greater in the former compared with the 
latter.45 Some scholars have justified their focus on published 
 
 43. Of the 41% of cases that are briefed and submitted, only one-quarter have published 
opinions. Data derived from Federal Judicial Center, Federal Court Cases: Integrated Data 
Base, 2006, Study No. 4685 (Oct. 9, 2007), http://www.icpsr.umich.edu/cocoon/ICPSR/ 
STUDY/09422.xml.  
 44. See, e.g., ROWLAND & CARP, supra note 21, at 123–28; David S. Law, Strategic 
Judicial Lawmaking: Ideology, Publication, and Asylum Law in the Ninth Circuit, 73 U. CIN. L. 
REV. 817 (2005); Susan M. Olson, Studying Federal District Courts Through Published Cases: 
A Research Note, 15 JUST. SYS. J. 782 (1992); Evan J. Ringquist & Craig E. Emmert, Judicial 
Policymaking in Published and Unpublished Decisions: The Case of Environmental Civil 
Litigation, 52 POL. RES. Q. 7 (1999); Peter Siegelman & John J. Donohue III, Studying the 
Iceberg from Its Tip: A Comparison of Published and Unpublished Employment Discrimination 
Cases, 24 LAW & SOC’Y REV. 1133 (1990); Donald R. Songer, Nonpublication in the United 
States District Courts: Official Criteria Versus Inferences from Appellate Review, 50 J. POL. 
206 (1988). 
 45. ROWLAND & CARP, supra note 21, at 123–28. As Evan J. Ringquist and Craig E. 
Emmert summarized in 1999: 
The most thorough comparison of political influences on published and unpublished 
district court decisions, that of Rowland and Carp (1996), reaches three general 
conclusions regarding this comparison. First, in almost all instances, court decisions in 
published cases were more “liberal” than court decisions in unpublished cases. . . . 
Second, more often than not, appointment effects were greater in published case 
decisions than in unpublished case decisions. . . . Finally, while Ducat and Dudley 
(1989) found that the published decisions of federal judges were much more likely to 
support the policy and legal positions of the presidents who appointed them, Rowland 
and Carp (1996) find no such cohort effect for unpublished decisions. 
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opinions by arguing that published opinions likely include the 
important, policy-making cases.46 However, it is not true that only 
unimportant or easy cases in the district courts are decided without 
published opinions.47 Donald Songer found that more than half of the 
court of appeals cases sampled that involved reversals or 
nonunanimous decisions (presumed to be more difficult cases) were 
reviewing unpublished district court decisions, and half of the portion 
of the Supreme Court’s caseload in the 1980 term that originated in 
federal trial courts had unpublished district court opinions.48 Thus, 
published district court opinions can neither be taken as 
representative of all district court opinions nor assumed to capture all 
of the important policy-making decisions. 
Although publication bias plagues both district court and court of 
appeals studies, another form of bias—introduced by the focus on 
opinions, whether or not published—particularly affects the study of 
district courts. As discussed above, a district judge may make many 
decisions of varying types at different points in time in a single case. 
Most are not accompanied by written reasons and therefore are 
recorded on the docket sheet or in a brief order as simply a decision 
to “grant” or “deny” a particular motion. For example, a judge will 
frequently decide motions to compel discovery without offering 
written reasons. Even decisions “on the merits”—a denial of a motion 
to dismiss, for example—may be issued without written explanation. 
Whether on the merits or not, these decisions can have a significant 
impact on the potential outcome and may reflect a judge’s attitude 
 
Ringquist & Emmert, supra note 44, at 15 (discussing ROWLAND & CARP, supra note 21, and 
Craig R. Ducat & Robert L. Dudley, Federal District Judges and Presidential Power During 
the Postwar Era, 51 J. POL. 98 (1989)). 
 46. ROBERT CARP & C. K. ROWLAND, POLICYMAKING AND POLITICS IN THE FEDERAL 
DISTRICT COURTS 18 (1983); ROWLAND & CARP supra note 21, at 20–21; Philip Shuchman & 
Alan Gelfand, The Use of Local Rule 21 in the Fifth Circuit: Can Judges Select Cases of “No 
Precendent Value”?, 29 EMORY L.J. 195 (1980). 
 47. Pamela Foa, A Snake in the Path of the Law: The Seventh Circuit’s Non-Publication 
Rule, 39 U. PITT. L. REV. 309 (1977); William L. Reynolds & William M. Richman, The Non-
Precedential Precedent—Limited Publication and No-Citation Rules in the United States 
Courts of Appeal, 78 COLUM. L. REV. 1167 (1978); cf. Donald Songer, Donna Smith & 
Reginald S. Sheehan, Nonpublication in the Eleventh Circuit: An Empirical Analysis, 16 FLA. 
ST. U. L. REV. 963 (1989); Allan Vestal, Reported Federal District Court Opinions: Fiscal 
1962, 4 HOUS. L. REV. 185 (1966).  
 48. Songer, supra note 44, at 211, 213.  
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toward the case or the litigants. However, without an accompanying 
written statement of reasons, the decision is not an “opinion” but an 
“order,” and, as such, it will not appear in Westlaw or Lexis, even as 
“unpublished.” Although such orders are also components of court 
decision-making worthy of study, they are largely inaccessible from 
traditional data sources. Using a sample from 2003—well after 
Westlaw and Lexis began systematically including unpublished 
opinions—David A. Hoffman, Alan J. Izenman, and Jeffrey R. 
Lidicker found that only 3% of judicial actions were accompanied by 
opinions.49 Even excluding purely ministerial orders, they were able 
to access written opinions for less than 20% of judicial orders in the 
cases they examined.50 Thus, unlike in the courts of appeals, many 
district court decisions are not captured at all in opinions, published 
or not, making opinions even more unrepresentative of district judge 
decision-making. Indeed, it seems plausible that judges are more 
likely to write opinions to accompany appealable orders—grants but 
not denials of motions to dismiss or of summary judgment, for 
example.51  
Litigant choices produce yet another type of selection effect that 
can bias studies of judicial decision-making that focus only on court 
opinions or even court decisions. As in the appellate courts,52 decided 
cases constitute only a fraction of disputes that are filed in the district 
courts. In 2006, for example, less than half of the cases disposed of 
by the district courts were resolved by some sort of adjudication. 
About the same proportion were either abandoned or settled.53 
 
 49. Hoffman et al., supra note 23, at 682. 
 50. Id. 
 51. Id. at 719–20 n.161, 720–21.  
 52. Not every appealable order is in fact appealed, and even among appealed cases, many 
are settled or abandoned by the parties prior to the issuance of an appellate decision. In 2006, 
for example, only about 40% of cases with noticed appeals in the federal courts of appeals 
proceeded to briefed submission and judicial decision. Federal Judicial Center, supra note 43. 
The set of such cases is defined by its exclusions: an additional 30% of the noticed cases were 
settled and withdrawn under FED. R. APP. P. 42 or defaulted by one party or the other, 26% 
were disposed of for non-merits reasons (jurisdictional defects, or denials of a certificate of 
appealability), and for the remainder the relevant fields do not specify the reason for the non-
merits disposition. 
 53. In 2006 (the last year for which data are available), of the cases disposed of by district 
courts (rather than transferred and the like), 47% were abandoned or settled, another 47% were 
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Because there is no reason to expect that cases settle randomly, 
litigated cases will be unrepresentative of filed cases.54 Moreover, 
given that district court cases unfold dynamically over time, the 
decisions observed at any particular stage of the litigation will be 
drawn from a different pool than those observed at another stage. For 
example, cases that are tried likely differ in important ways from 
those in which a summary judgment decision is reached; those cases 
in turn likely differ from those in which some discovery occurs. 
Thus, the litigants’ choices regarding whether and when to settle or 
abandon a case have the effect of selecting which cases survive long 
enough to evoke different types of court decisions. 
Because of these various selection effects, studying only district 
court opinions—particularly only published opinions—creates 
significant risks of misleading results. Consider, for example, 
Rowland and Carp’s classic study of district judge decision-making, 
which asks whether district judges’ decisions are influenced by their 
ideology. As they acknowledge, by looking only at published 
opinions, they may well over- or under-estimate the role of 
ideology.55 It may be the case, as their own preliminary look at 
unpublished opinions suggests, that decisions not memorialized in a 
written opinion are less subject to political influences and that 
therefore the effects of ideology will be less significant across the 
whole range of district judge decisions than appears from an analysis 
of published opinions.56 Alternatively, district judges may be more 
inclined to allow their policy preferences to hold sway when their 
decisions are subject to the least scrutiny—because they are 
 
adjudicated in some way (a mere 1% by trial), and 6% do not have available data on the 
disposition type. Id. 
 54. See Siegelman & Donohue, supra note 44. Of course, it is also true that filed cases are 
unrepresentative of all disputes, because potential litigants must first recognize their injuries as 
grievances and decide to pursue litigation, and their decisions to do so will not be random. See 
William L.F. Felstiner, Richard L. Abel & Austin Sarat, The Emergence and Transformation of 
Disputes: Naming, Blaming, Claiming . . ., 15 LAW & SOC’Y REV. 631 (1980). More 
specifically, as Ahmed Taha has suggested, litigant choices to file a case or not may be 
influenced by the composition or perceived preferences of the trial bench. Ahmed E. Taha, 
Judges’ Political Orientations and the Selection of Disputes for Litigation (Wake Forest 
University Legal Studies Paper No. 963468, 2007), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract= 
963468. 
 55. ROWLAND & CARP, supra note 21, at 121–23. 
 56. Id. 
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expressed in the form of a summary order and are unlikely to be 
reviewed by an appellate court.57 Another possibility, not explicitly 
explored by Rowland and Carp is that the role of ideology may vary 
depending upon the stage of litigation at which a judge decides. 
Similarly, Sisk et al.’s conclusion, based on a study of published 
opinions, that the religious background of judges influences their 
decisions in religious freedom cases58 may also hold true of their 
decisions in summary orders or on procedural matters. But without 
examining all district judge decisions and controlling for the 
procedural context in which they are made, there is simply no way to 
know. 
III. STUDYING DISTRICT COURT DECISION-MAKING  
Given the significant problems introduced by relying on 
opinions—particularly only published opinions—we argue for a 
different approach for studying district judge decision-making, one 
that takes into account the institutional role of district courts and the 
nature of judging at the trial court level. In brief, we believe that the 
study of district judge decision-making should focus on decisions, not 
opinions. That is, it should encompass all decisions—whether or not 
published and whether or not accompanied by written reasons—and, 
in doing so, should take into account the specific procedural context 
in which those decisions are made.  
One of the principal justifications in the past for relying on 
published opinions was purely practical. In 1969, for example, 
Dolbeare defended his use of opinions by pointing out the absence of 
a practicable alternative: 
For what it may be worth in exculpatory terms, we may note 
that there appears to be no more rigorous way to gather data on 
the outcomes of cases [other than relying on opinions in F. 
Supp.], short of a review of transcripts in each court’s file—a 
 
 57. Orley Ashenfelter, Theodore Eisenberg & Stewart J. Schwab, Politics and the 
Judiciary: The Influence of Judicial Background on Case Outcomes, 24 J. LEG. STUD. 257, 264 
(1995) (arguing that judicial decision-making is more likely to be constrained when a judge 
must articulate reasons for a decision).  
 58. Sisk, Heise & Morriss, supra note 34. 
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task whose dimensions foreclose the prospect of more than 
case study or sampling, rather than comparative terms.59  
 Technological advances have obviated this justification. Over 
time, Lexis and Westlaw have included an increasing number of 
unpublished opinions in their databases, making these opinions as 
easy to access as officially “published” opinions. More importantly, 
however, with the advent of electronic docketing systems, researchers 
can access information on all court activity, not just opinions, in a 
given case. Each of the ninety-four U.S. district courts now uses a 
system, entitled “Public Access to Court Electronic Records” 
(“PACER”), that makes this information available on the internet.60 
Complete electronic docket sheets are available in most districts for 
cases filed from the mid-1990s on. In each subsequent year, coverage 
has increased, and it is essentially universal for current cases. PACER 
docket sheets offer a wealth of readily accessible information 
permitting study of how cases proceed through the district courts and 
what role judges play. They identify the district judge and any 
magistrate judges connected to the case, as well as the parties and 
their lawyers. They also contain brief descriptions and the dates of 
every litigation event before the court—such as the filing of 
pleadings and motions, court orders, hearings, conferences, and 
verdicts.61 Thus, with internet access, dockets can now be retrieved 
for federal cases nationwide at a small fraction of the cost and effort 
once required to obtain that information.  
In addition to the docket sheets, PACER makes other case 
documents available electronically. Under the Case Management/ 
Electronic Case Files system (“CM/ECF”), the parties file case 
 
 59. Kenneth M. Dolbeare, The Federal District Courts and Urban Public Policy: An 
Exploratory Study, in FRONTIERS OF JUDICIAL RESEARCH 378 (Joel B. Grossman & Joseph 
Tanenhaus eds., 1969).  
 60. Electronic Public Access Fee Schedule (Issued in accordance with 28 U.S.C. §§ 1913, 
1914, 1926, 1930, 1932) (Mar. 11, 2008), http://pacer.psc.uscourts.gov/documents/epa_ 
feesched.pdf. 
 61. These entries are done free-form by clerk’s office staff, within hours of the events’ 
occurrence. Because maintenance of dockets is a core function of court clerk’s office personnel, 
PACER dockets are extraordinarily accurate. For a proposal that dockets include mark-up 
coding, to allow their easier batch analysis, see Lynn Lopucki, Court System Transparency, 
(Wash. Univ. Sch. of Law, Working Paper No. 07-10-01, 2008), available at http://papers.ssrn. 
com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1013380.  
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documents such as pleadings and motions papers electronically in 
portable document format (“pdf”). The court then links these 
electronic documents to the relevant docket entries recording their 
filing. Since about 2005, pdf versions of case documents have been 
available through PACER for nearly every case in nearly every 
district, and in some districts they are available for documents dating 
back as many as ten years. These documents can be downloaded for a 
fee of 8¢ per page (with a maximum of $2.40 per document).62 
Written opinions filed after mid-2005 are available for free.63 Thus, 
PACER offers a significant data source for more accurately capturing 
and understanding the activity of the district courts.64  
We propose that, rather than relying on opinions, scholars use 
dockets and the other case documents available on PACER as data 
sources for studying district judge decision-making. By looking at 
dockets, researchers can capture all of the critical decisions in a case, 
thereby avoiding the problems of selection bias introduced by relying 
only on opinions or published opinions.  
Only a handful of prior studies, some pre-dating the advent of 
PACER,65 have made use of dockets to understand district court 
litigation, and none has fully exploited the advantages of doing so for 
studying district judge decision-making.66 For example, the Civil 
 
 62. Electronic Public Access Fee Schedule, supra note 60.  
 63. E-Government Act of 2002, Pub. L. No. 107–347, § 204–05, 116 Stat. 2899, 2913–14 
(codified in notes of 44 U.S.C. § 3501) (2006). 
 64. See Peter Martin, Online Access to Court Records—From Documents to Data, 
Particulars to Patterns (Cornell Legal Studies Research Paper No. 08-003, 2008), 
available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1107412 (detailing 
PACER’s advancements and drawbacks).  
 65. In addition to the studies discussed below in notes 66–70, examples of other studies 
using non-internet methods to obtain dockets include Christian Wollschläger, Civil Litigation 
and Modernization: The Work of the Municipal Courts of Bremen, Germany, in Five Centuries, 
1549–1984, 24 LAW & SOC’Y REV. 261, 262–64 (1990); F. Van Loon & E. Langerwerf, 
Socioeconomic Development and the Evolution of Litigation Rates of Civil Courts in Belgium, 
1835–1980, 24 LAW & SOC’Y REV. 283 (1990); Ross E. Cheit & Jacob E. Gersen, When 
Businesses Sue Each Other: An Empirical Study of State Court Litigation, 25 LAW & SOC. 
INQUIRY 789 (2000). For a critique of these sorts of studies, see Richard Lempert, Docket Data 
and “Local Knowledge”: Studying the Court and Society Link Over Time, 24 LAW & SOC’Y 
REV. 321 (1990). 
 66. A number of scholars have used docket research as a way of understanding the 
makeup of particular court caseloads (for example, to assess time trends relating to which 
disputes get litigated or litigation rates, or to describe litigation activity and its participants or 
intensity). Other studies have used dockets to assess case outcomes (for example, Burbank’s 
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Litigation Research Project (“CLRP”) collected docket, case file, and 
interview data on over 1600 civil lawsuits terminated in 1978 in 5 
federal and 5 state trial courts. That project, however, focused on the 
cost, pace, frequency, and stakes of mid-range civil disputes67 and on 
the settlement dynamics between parties68 rather than on judicial 
decision-making. To the extent that the CLRP examined the role of 
the judge in promoting settlement, it did so not by examining docket 
activity in individual cases, but by aggregating survey data on 
judicial case management practices within each district studied.69  
Eisenberg and Schwab also collected data from dockets in order to 
assess the nature and extent of civil rights and prisoner litigation in 
three federal district courts during 1980-81.70 Together with 
Ashenfelter, they used this data source to test whether judicial 
background influences settlement and win rates in these types of 
cases.71 Specifically, they used measures such as the mean settlement 
rate or the mean plaintiff win rate for each district judge in their study 
to capture case outcomes. Comparing these outcomes measures 
across judges, they found little evidence that individual judge 
characteristics explain variation in outcomes.72 By using dockets to 
 
study of the use of summary judgment). Stephen B. Burbank, Vanishing Trials and Summary 
Judgment in Federal Civil Cases: Drifting Toward Bethlehem or Gomorrah?, 1 J. EMP. LEGAL 
STUD. 591 (2004). For other examples of use of digitized dockets as a datasource on case 
outcomes more than case dynamics, see, for example, Margo Schlanger, Inmate Litigation, 116 
HARV. L. REV. 1555 (2003) (using dockets along with other data); Josh Lerner, Tilting the 
Table? The Use of Preliminary Injunctions, 44 J.L. & ECON. 573 (2001) (using dockets to 
analyze preliminary relief in patent cases). Although these types of studies inform us about 
litigation trends and the nature of disputing, they have not taken advantage of dockets to study 
judicial decision-making.  
 67. For information on the Civil Litigation Research Project, see, for example, David M. 
Trubek, Austin Sarat, William L.F. Felstiner, Herbert M. Kritzer, & Joel B. Grossman, The 
Costs of Ordinary Litigation, 31 UCLA L. REV. 72 (1983).  
 68. See, e.g., HERBERT M. KRITZER, LET’S MAKE A DEAL: UNDERSTANDING THE 
NEGOTIATION PROCESS IN ORDINARY LITIGATION (1991). 
 69. See, e.g., Herbert M. Kritzer, The Judge’s Role in Pretrial Case Processing: Assessing 
the Need for Change, 66 JUDICATURE 28 (1982).  
 70. See Theodore Eisenberg, Section 1983: Doctrinal Foundations and an Empirical 
Study, 67 CORNELL L. REV. 482 (1982); Theodore Eisenberg & Stewart Schwab, The Reality of 
Constitutional Tort Litigation, 72 CORNELL L. REV. 641 (1987); Stewart J. Schwab & Theodore 
Eisenberg, Explaining Constitutional Tort Litigation: The Influence of the Attorney Fees Statute 
and the Government as Defendant, 73 CORNELL L. REV. 719 (1988).  
 71. Ashenfelter et al., supra note 57. 
 72. Id. at 281. 
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collect data on all filed civil rights cases, they avoided many of the 
selection problems plaguing other studies of judicial decision-
making. However, their method for testing for judge effects—
comparing mean outcomes across individual judges—requires 
aggregating results, thus treating all settlements alike and all court 
judgments for plaintiffs alike. It matters, though, not only whether, 
but when, settlement occurs. Similarly, a court outcome for the 
plaintiff that results from a summary judgment ruling differs from 
one that is the result of a jury verdict. Each result suggests something 
different about judicial decision-making. 
More recently, Hoffman et al. have argued, as we do here, for the 
intensive study of trial court dockets available through PACER and 
against reliance on opinions.73 In particular, they were focused on the 
particular question of when district judges choose to write opinions—
that is, to provide written reasons to accompany their decisions—
rather than relying on summary orders. Examining decisions, rather 
than opinions, they found that each case typically involves multiple 
judicial decisions and that the distribution of court activity across 
cases is highly skewed, with many cases having only a handful of 
docket entries, while a few cases had hundreds.74 After categorizing 
court decisions by procedural type—management orders, 
intermediate orders and final action orders—they found that the 
likelihood that a given order would result in a written opinion varied 
substantially with the type of order and concluded that the decision to 
write an opinion is significantly affected by the procedural context.75 
 
 73. Hoffman et al., supra note 23. They propose a methodological approach they call 
“docketology”—that is, “the intensive study of trial court dockets” and contrast it with the 
standard approach of “opinionology”—gathering a sample of court opinions and subjecting 
them to analysis. Id. at 684–85, 694. 
 74. Id. at 709. 
 75. “Management orders” in Hoffman et al.’s classification scheme are orders, such as 
discovery orders, that “are rarely immediately appealable.” Id. at 715. They also refer to 
“intermediate orders,” such as motions to dismiss, that are only sometimes appealed and “final 
actions orders”, like summary judgment, that are “almost always conclusive and appealable.” 
Id. at 715. To the extent that this classification is intended to capture the likelihood of an 
appeal, the categories are imprecise because the actual outcome of the motion—i.e., whether a 
summary judgment motion is granted or denied—will affect the likelihood that it will be 
appealed. The authors recognize this issue and take it into account in their later analysis. See id. 
at 719–20. Regardless of the inexactness of their classification scheme, Hoffman and his 
colleagues make an important contribution by demonstrating that the likelihood that a district 
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Their work demonstrates the risks of studying only opinions, as well 
as the possibilities of using dockets as a source of data. However, 
their research focused narrowly on the question of when judges write 
opinions rather than using the wealth of data available in dockets to 
examine why judges make the substantive decisions that they do.  
Although each of these prior studies relying on dockets for 
information has contributed insights not available from a limited 
focus on opinions, they failed to fully exploit the possibilities for 
using docket information to study district judge decision-making. In 
particular, studying dockets offers several distinct advantages. First, 
dockets allow researchers to take into account the stage of litigation 
in which a particular judicial decision occurs and to control for the 
effects of procedural context. Second, by examining what types of 
cases settle at what stages of the litigation, researchers can directly 
study the selection process that shapes the pool of cases that are 
resolved by adjudication. And finally, the reverse question can be 
explored as well: Does judicial decision-making affect the parties’ 
settlement decisions? 
The first advantage is that studying dockets permits a comparison 
of decisions which are truly comparable—i.e., those made in the 
same procedural context—rather than simply comparing whatever 
decisions are available. In traditional outcome studies of court 
opinions, researchers tend to lump together all “liberal” decisions—
for example, votes in favor of a civil rights plaintiff—without paying 
attention to the type of decision being made. However, a decision to 
deny a motion to dismiss that favors a civil rights plaintiff has a very 
different consequence than a decision entering a verdict in favor of 
that same plaintiff. Moreover, the same judge who denied a 
defendant’s motion to dismiss early in a case may subsequently grant 
its motion for summary judgment. Thus, ignoring the type of decision 
being made creates not so much a problem of comparing apples to 
oranges, but one of comparing tadpoles to frogs: differences among 
observations may be attributable to the stage of the litigation at which 
the decision is made. 
 
judge’s decision will be accompanied by a written opinion varies significantly depending upon 
the type of decision. 
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This problem is best illustrated with some examples. Suppose a 
study undertakes to examine whether political affiliation or social 
background factors influence the likelihood that a judge will vote in 
favor of plaintiffs in certain types of cases. Consider four 
hypothetical cases with the following event histories: 
 
 Case A Case B Case C Case D 
Event 1 Complaint filed Complaint filed Complaint filed Complaint filed 
Event 2 Settled Answer filed Answer filed  Answer filed 
Event 3  D. moves for SJ D. moves for SJ D. moves for SJ 
Event 4  SJ denied SJ denied SJ granted 
Event 5  Settled Trial  
Event 6   D. verdict   
OUTCOME Settled Settled Judgment for D. Judgment for D.
 
A study that focused only on case outcomes might view cases A 
and B as similar and C and D as similar. However, the outcomes in 
each pair of cases are not identical. From the perspective of judicial 
decision-making, cases B and C are more similar than A and B, or C 
and D. After all, in cases B and C, the judge denied defendants’ 
motion for summary judgment. If the goal is to understand judicial 
decision-making, it is important to recognize that the judge’s 
summary judgment decision in C (at event 4) was the opposite of the 
analogous decision in D (also at event 4). To state the point more 
generally, because district court litigation occurs in sequence, the 
stage or procedural posture of a decision is crucial. Looking only at 
the end result or comparing judgments made at different points in the 
litigation that happen to be observable misapprehends the role of 
district judges and risks mischaracterizing their work.  
Procedural context also matters because different district court 
decisions face different risks of appellate reversal. Depending upon 
the type of decision, the probability that appellate review will occur 
at all can vary drastically, and the standard of review that will be 
applied may differ as well. Many district court decisions, such as 
rulings on discovery or procedural matters, are effectively 
unreviewable because they are not final judgments that are 
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immediately appealable.76 While interlocutory appeal is theoretically 
possible, an extremely small proportion of non-final decisions are 
ever subject to such appeal;77 without the right to immediate review 
an aggrieved party has little recourse. Any errors by the district court 
may become moot if the case is settled or ultimately resolved in that 
party’s favor. Even if the objection is preserved and raised on appeal 
after a final judgment, the appellate court will be reluctant to void a 
judgment reached after a case was fully litigated on the basis of 
erroneous rulings early in the proceedings.78 Thus, procedural 
decisions regarding matters such as party joinder or discovery are 
effectively insulated from review. Even some significant substantive 
rulings, such as a partial grant of summary judgment, may be difficult 
to reverse after a case is finally concluded.79 For those decisions that 
are appealed, the degree of scrutiny given the district court’s decision 
will vary depending upon the type of decision. Questions of law are 
closely re-examined under an exacting de novo standard,80 while 
appellate courts are far more deferential to district court findings of 
fact or decisions relating to the management of the lawsuit.81 Because 
dockets provide information about all types of district court 
decisions, researchers can take into account the procedural context 
when studying district judges’ decisions. 
A second advantage to utilizing dockets as a data source is that it 
allows direct study of selection effects. Filed cases reach discovery 
only if they survive the pleadings stage. Summary judgment is 
considered only if a case was not dismissed at the pleadings stage and 
no settlement has occurred. Cases are tried only if any summary 
judgment motion was denied. And so on. Thus, selection effects will 
progressively limit the pool of cases actually adjudicated at various 
stages of the litigation, and these pools of cases surviving at each 
 
 76. 28 U.S.C. § 1291 (2006). 
 77. See Solimine, supra note 26, at 1174. 
 78. Appellate courts should not reverse for “errors or defects which do not affect the 
substantial rights of the parties.” 28 U.S.C. § 2111 (2006). 
 79. See Stephen C. Yeazell, The Misunderstood Consequences of Modern Civil Process, 
1994 WIS. L. REV. 631, 660–66 (explaining how expanded pretrial activity and rules of appeal 
have created a significant set of lower court rulings that are effectively unreviewable). 
 80. 19 JAMES WM. MOORE ET AL., MOORE’S FEDERAL PRACTICE § 206.04[1] (3d ed. 
2008). 
 81. Id. at §§ 206.03 [1]–[6], 206.05[1].  
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stage may differ in systematic ways from all filed cases and from 
each other. Information from dockets allows the researcher to track 
the entire progress of cases over time and therefore to model these 
selection effects. Which cases with what characteristics survive to 
each stage of the litigation process? And how do the cases subject to 
adjudication at each stage differ from filed cases and from one 
another?  
Finally, dockets permit exploration of a closely related question: 
Does judicial decision-making influence the parties’ settlement 
decisions? To the extent that scholars have paid attention to selection 
effects, they have assumed that their importance lies in limiting the 
pool of cases that remain to be adjudicated.82 While this effect is 
important, the possibility that judicial decision-making in turn 
influences settlement behavior has been largely ignored in empirical 
studies of district court litigation.83 Theory instructs that litigants’ 
willingness to settle turns on their expectations regarding the ultimate 
outcome of the case. Although the parties may begin the litigation 
with an estimate of the likely outcome, they will have repeated 
opportunities for updating their predictions as they glean additional 
information about the strengths and weaknesses of their cases during 
the litigation process. The district judge, by ruling on procedural 
matters, commenting informally on the evidence, and even by setting 
schedules, can dramatically impact the parties’ estimates of their 
chances of success before, during, and after trial, thereby encouraging 
settlement and influencing its terms.84 In fact, one of the premises of 
 
 82. See, e.g., Ashenfelter et al., supra note 57, at 259 (observing that because litigants can 
decide to settle a case or present it to the court for judgment, cases actually adjudicated are 
unlikely to be a random sample of filed cases); Siegelman & Donohue, supra note 44 (arguing 
that because of litigant selection effects and judge publication decisions, published district court 
decisions are not representative of cases filed). 
 83. Some scholars have noted this possibility. For example, Rowland and Carp suggest 
that pretrial rulings “can change dramatically the balance of probable trial outcomes and, 
therefore, of each side’s incentives to settle a case.” ROWLAND & CARP supra note 21, at 122; 
see also KRITZER, supra note 68. This theory, however, has not been subjected to much 
empirical testing. While Ashenfelter et al. tested for judge effects on case outcomes including 
settlements, they aggregate these outcomes by judge, comparing, for example, mean settlement 
rates per judge, rather than testing whether specific judicial decisions influenced the likelihood 
of settlement. Ashenfelter et al., supra note 57, at 270–77. 
 84. The situation in appellate courts is not exactly analogous. Because oral argument is 
typically the only pre-decisional contact that the parties have with the appellate judges deciding 
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the shift to managerial judging is that the actively involved trial judge 
can more quickly move cases towards resolution. By collecting data 
on district judge interventions in a case and the timing of settlement, 
researchers can test whether the decisions of the district judge 
influence litigant settlement decisions.  
IV. OUR EEOC PROJECT 
In an ongoing project, we seek to exploit these advantages of 
using dockets as a data source. Currently, we are collecting and 
analyzing data on federal court litigation brought between October 1, 
1996, and September 30, 2006, by the Equal Employment 
Opportunity Commission (“EEOC”), the federal agency charged with 
enforcing the laws forbidding race, color, national origin, religion, 
sex, age, and disability discrimination by employers. We began with 
a list of the nearly 4000 employment discrimination cases filed in all 
district courts by the EEOC on behalf of individual complainants 
during this time period. We stratified our initial, comprehensive list 
of cases into two groups. Group 1 consisted of all cases in which a 
trial or appeal took place, cases resolved by a judicial decision, and 
cases involving more than one “benefited party.”85 The nearly 1700 
cases in this group were all included in our sample. Group 2 
consisted of the remaining 2220-plus cases; of these, we randomly 
selected 1000 for inclusion in our study. From this initial sample, a 
handful were dropped because they did not in fact fit the criteria for 
inclusion or the relevant data was missing or difficult to code,86 
 
their case, party expectations of what the judges will likely do are probably very stable, with 
few opportunities for updating. Of course, if the parties are notified of the judges on their 
assigned panel in advance, it might influence their expectations of the outcome and, hence, the 
likelihood of settlement. In that case, however, it is not anything that the judges do, but simply 
who they are that influences the likelihood of settlement. However, interactions at oral 
argument can give the parties a direct sense of how the judges view the particular case, just as 
the many pre-trial rulings of a district court judge entail contacts that give the parties 
information about their litigation prospects. See, e.g., JONATHAN MATTHEW COHEN, INSIDE 
APPELLATE COURTS: THE IMPACT OF COURT ORGANIZATION ON JUDICIAL DECISION MAKING 
IN THE UNITED STATES COURTS OF APPEALS 55–63 (2002).  
 85. Note that some of the cases in Group 1 had more than one of these features. 
 86. Cases were dropped from the sample for the following types of reasons: cases could 
not be found because the docket number in our initial list was missing or, apparently, incorrect; 
the case involved enforcement of an administrative subpoena rather than an antidiscrimination 
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resulting in a final sample of about 2500 cases for analysis. For each, 
we are using the district court docket number provided by the EEOC 
to search PACER for additional data. We have located docket sheets 
in all the cases, as well as pleadings and settlement documents in a 
substantial portion of them. 
From the case docket, we collect information about the judge, the 
defendants, any intervening private parties, the motions filed in the 
case, the timing and disposition of those motions, and whether and 
when the case settled. In cases resolved by a judicial decision, we 
collect information on the type of decision (e.g., dismissal, summary 
judgment granted, trial, etc.), the prevailing party, the amount of 
monetary relief, whether injunctive relief was granted, and whether 
the losing party appealed.  
The database we are constructing is very comprehensive but fairly 
ordinary for the most part (except that it is web-based, to facilitate 
multiple users’ access, and provides links to the relevant documents, 
to facilitate both data entry and review). But it does have one unusual 
feature. Most research databases are “flat”—that is, they array the 
data in a two-dimensional grid with rows and columns. But a flat 
database could not accommodate the enormous variation in the 
number, type, and sequence of party motions, court orders, and other 
litigation events in the district courts. We have therefore built the 
database to incorporate multiple tables, to allow us to enter 
information on as many case events as occur. Each case in the 
database is an observation in the main table. Additional tables record 
information about each litigation event in a case as a separate 
observation with its own row of data, which is then linked to the main 
table. Thus, for each case, we are able to capture any number of case 
events, from zero to thousands.87  
 
lawsuit; the case involved preliminary injunctive enforcement of a settlement reached and 
memorialized outside of litigation; the case was a lawsuit against a governmental defendant; the 
case turned out to have been filed prior to our study period; or the case was consolidated with 
other litigation in a way that was too complex to be captured by our coding protocol. 
 87. For each motion, we collect: Date; Docket Entry #; Type; Filing Party; Consent 
Status; Written Opposition Filed; Date of Outcome; Outcome Docket Entry #; Identity of 
Decision-maker; and Outcome. For each non-motion event, we collect: Date; Docket Entry #, 
and Event Type. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
112 Journal of Law & Policy [Vol. 29:83 
 
 
These data will allow us to conduct tests and analyses of district 
court litigation and judicial decision-making that would be 
impossible with traditional sources of outcome data. For example, we 
plan to test theories of judicial decision-making using all district 
court decisions in EEOC litigated cases—published and unpublished, 
final and non-final—while taking into account the procedural context 
of each decision. The data will allow us to model different types of 
decisions separately and to consider how the different risks of 
appellate review might affect those decisions. In addition, we plan to 
use a hazard model to predict the distribution of settlements over 
time, examining not only the effect of case characteristics potentially 
relevant to the settlement decision but also the timing and nature of 
judicial interventions. 
CONCLUSION 
Empirical study of district judge decision-making has long been 
limited by both inadequate theoretical models and inaccessible data. 
However, the development of the electronic filing system in federal 
courts and the current availability of dockets and litigation documents 
through PACER have significantly reduced the obstacles to obtaining 
detailed information about the work of the district courts. In order to 
fully exploit the wealth of data now coming on line, researchers need 
to develop better models of district court decision-making. Given the 
significant differences between appellate and trial court decision-
making, traditional models that analyze only opinions, treat all 
district judges alike, and ignore the impact of settlement are simply 
inadequate. Instead, we argue for a new approach—one that uses 
dockets to study district judge decisions (not just opinions), takes into 
account the procedural context of these decisions, and directly studies 
how the settlement behavior of litigants may both influence and be 
influenced by district judge decision-making. Only after developing 
models that incorporate the unique institutional setting of district 
courts in these ways can empirical research bring greater 
understanding of district judge decision-making. 
